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COMMENT
VIRTUAL ADULTERY: NO PHYSICAL HARM, NO FOUL?
Kathryn Pfeiffer *
New forms of social media and virtual communication are
changing the ways in which we meet new people and develop
meaningful relationships. In today's world, you can skype a
long-distance significant other or join an Internet chat room
to find others who share a similar interest. While, in many
ways, the Internet has facilitated our ability to interact with
others unencumbered by geographical location or time zone,
its unfettered reach has proved to be problematic for one re-
lationship in particular-the marital unit. Studies show
that more marriages are ending because of "virtual infideli-
ty," the term used to describe nonphysical behavior that
adopts characteristics of a romantic relationship. This com-
ment examines the cultural phenomenon of virtual infidelity
against traditional divorce statutes, which only recognize
physical infidelity as a fault-based ground for divorce. It ul-
timately advocates that the traditional definition of adultery
be expanded to include "virtual adultery," spousal infidelity
that rises to the level of legally actionable conduct, as a
fault-based ground for divorce.
* Law Clerk, Hon. Glen A. Huff, Virginia Court of Appeals. J.D., 2011, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2006, Davidson College. This comment was a first-place
winner of the 2011 McNeill Writing Competition sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of
the University of Richmond School of Law. This comment benefited from the guidance of
Meredith Harbach, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Ric Hoogestraat's picture-perfect marriage to his part-
ner, Tenaj-which included a house with a mortgage, pets, and
pastimes such as riding together on his motorcycle-earned noto-
riety precisely for the normalcy it exemplified.' Their relation-
ship, in fact, was anything but normal-because Tenaj was Ric's
virtual wife whom he met and interacted with daily through a
computer game-and Ric's real marriage was suffering.2 His ac-
tual wife, Sue Hoogestraat, felt "widowed" by her husband's vir-
tual life and did not expect him to return to her soon: "This other
life is so wonderful; it's better than real life. Nobody gets fat, no-
body gets gray. The person that's left can't compete with that."'
Although this type of behavior affects the marital relationship,
the law does not consider it actionable conduct. With so much so-
cially driven media available, however, it is difficult to draw a
bright line between reality and fantasy. For example, an ABC
News survey conducted in 2004 found that forty-two percent of
women and twenty-five percent of men considered visiting web-
sites with sexual content to be cheating. These findings covered
only passive Internet sites-they did not include interactive sites
in which a spouse engaged with a third person, like Ric and
Tenaj.'
While the traditional definition of adultery describes the physi-
cal infidelity of a spouse,6 new forms of social media and virtual
communication are shaping the way relationships (including ex-
tramarital physical and nonphysical relationships) are conducted.
More communication takes place outside the confines of the mar-
riage-even if still within the home.' New norms of interaction,
such as the workplace relationship, are also becoming a source of
1. See Alexandra Alter, Is This Man Cheating on His Wife?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2007, at W1.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. GARY LANGER ET AL., ABC NEWS PRIMETIME LIVE POLL, THE AMERICAN SEX
SURVEY: A PEEK BENEATH THE SHEETS 23 (2004).
5. See id.; see also Alter, supra note 1.
6. See Christina Tavella Hall, Sex Online: Is This Adultery?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 201, 210-11 (1997).
7. See Karen S. Peterson, Infidelity Reaches Beyond Having Sex, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,
2003, at 8D (noting that cybersex and virtual affairs on the Internet are popular areas of
interest among professionals who study spousal infidelity).
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significant extramarital communication.' These trends raise new
questions about the meaning of adultery.
There is a long tradition of protecting marriage by deterring
behavior that could impair the marital relationship. Adultery
constitutes the classic erosion of trust in a marriage-it "entails
lying, the breaking of promises, and the infliction of emotional
pain."' "Virtual affairs" are emerging as a recognizable subset of
infidelity, grounded in the idea that a nonphysical extramarital
relationship can produce the same emotional intimacy of a sexual
affair and cause the same type of harm to a marriage.10 Commen-
tators use the term "virtual infidelity" to describe nonphysical
behavior that adopts one or more aspects of a romantic relation-
ship and consequently creates a disconnect in the marriage." Alt-
hough virtual infidelity is a fairly new topic of legal discourse and
has thus far earned more recognition as a cultural phenomenon
than a legal claim, 2 it raises familiar policy questions about pro-
tecting the intimacy of the marital unit and insulating it from
impairment.
This comment considers whether virtual adultery should con-
stitute actionable conduct in civil divorce litigation and proceeds
in three parts. Following this introduction, Part II discusses the
historical roots of adultery as a fault ground for divorce and its
perpetuation of gender disparities. It then analyzes the applica-
tion of adultery in the wake of no-fault divorce, including its
emerging influence on civil divorce judgments. Part III discusses
the intersection of social media and infidelity, evaluating the rise
of emotional intimacy as an alternative to the traditional re-
quirement of physical intimacy in the context of adultery. Part IV
considers how the law should approach virtual infidelity as a po-
tential subset of adultery.
8. Id.
9. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Ex-
tramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1674 (1991) [hereinafter Constitutional Barriers].
10. Brenda Cossman, The New Politics of Adultery, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274,
280 (2006).
11. See id. at 277. This comment uses the term "virtual infidelity" to describe spousal
infidelity more generally and the term "virtual adultery" to describe virtual infidelity that
may rise to the level of legally actionable conduct.
12. See Hall, supra note 6, at 203-04, 212.
13. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 79, 120 (1991).
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Ultimately, Part IV seeks to contribute to the discussion of
whether the definition of adultery should extend to virtual infi-
delity, and if so, what approaches might be used to identify virtu-
al adultery. It evaluates the harms caused by traditional adultery
in comparison to the emergence of virtual infidelity, and asks
whether their mutual roots in emotional intimacy merit similar
remedial schemes. Ultimately, it suggests incorporating virtual
infidelity into existing statutory fault considerations and defer-
ring to judicial discretion to determine its weight on a case-by-
case basis.
II. APPLICATION OF ADULTERY AS A FAULT GROUND
A. Evolution of Fault-Based Divorce
Divorce law in the United States largely derives from evolving
models of marital dissolution in Europe.14 The advent of Christi-
anity, particularly Roman Catholicism, began to shape divorce
legislation in third-century Europe." The underpinnings of fault
were evident in Emperor Constantine's constitution, which creat-
ed gender-specific standards for dissolution: "The husband had
the right to divorce his wife if she were an adulteress, a poisoner
or a conspirator. The wife could divorce her husband if he were a
murderer, a prisoner or a violator of graves."16 This legislation
sought a middle ground between the absolute prohibition of di-
vorce desired by emerging Christian sects and the policy interest
in providing at least some avenue for dissolution, no matter how
17
narrow.
The United States looked to models of fault-based divorce in es-
tablishing its own approach to marital dissolution. From the
seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the states uni-
formly prohibited a spouse from obtaining a divorce in the ab-
sence of a legally recognized fault ground." Available fault
14. See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western Legal
Tradition, 50 LOY. L. REV. 407, 421 (2004).
15. Id. at 409.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 421.
19. See id.
[Vol. 46:667670
VIRTUAL ADULTERY
grounds generally included adultery, desertion, impotence,
fraudulent contract, consanguinity, and bigamy.20 Some jurisdic-
tions also recognized cruelty, insanity, criminal behavior, and re-
peated substance abuse.21 Although fault is no longer a prerequi-
site to divorce, many states still allow spouses to pursue a fault-
based alternative and weigh fault as an important factor in allo-
cating property and spousal support.22
B. Historical Application of Adultery as a Fault Ground
Since the dual recognition of fault and no-fault grounds for di-
vorce, evidence of adultery has consistently influenced divorce lit-
igation outcomes.2 3 Adultery as a fault ground derives largely
from the impact of unbalanced gender roles on traditional mar-
riage units.2 4 The principle of coverture dictated that, once mar-
ried, "the very being or legal existence of the woman [was] sus-
pended."25 William Blackstone, in his commentary on coverture,
characterized this transformation as a "civil death."2 6 As such, a
woman's legal identity was subsumed by her husband upon mar-
riage, and her property transferred to him.27 The husband, in
turn, had a proportionate duty to protect his wife and pay any
debts she incurred." The notion that, through marriage, a hus-
20. Id. at 416, 421.
21. Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in
Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 608-09 (1996).
22. Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with No-Fault Divorce,
17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243, 259 (2004-2005); see Morse, supra note 21, at 614 (noting that
thirty states have statutes that recognize both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce); see
also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 20 (1985) (explaining
that California's new no-fault scheme created a ground for dissolution based on "marital
breakdown" or a semantic variation of the term generally labeled "irreconcilable differ-
ences").
23. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in
a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2532-33 (1994).
24. See id. at 2526.
25. Nehal A. Patel, Note, The State's Perpetual Protection of Adultery: Examining
Koestler v. Pollard and Wisconsin's Faded Adultery Torts, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1013, 1016-
17 (2003) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
339 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in
Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 917 (2010) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 339 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001)).
27. See id. (citing J.G. FICHTE, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS 402 (A.E. Kroger trans., Har-
per & Row 1970) (1889)).
28. Patel, supra note 25, at 1017 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
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band acquired not only a wife but also a collection-or "consorti-
um"-of interests associated with the wife eventually led courts
to recognize a marital right to "conjugal affection."" This right le-
gally granted a husband exclusive intimate dominion over his
wife and an assurance of her fidelity to him." As such, one
spouse's adultery, while not creating actual injury to the other
spouse, would nevertheless intrude on the cloak of extended mar-
ital interests recognized by courts.' A wife's infidelity constituted
not only a wrongdoing against the marriage but also a breach of
the inherent property contract that their marriage had created.3 2
Gender disparities persisted when adultery became a judicially
recognized fault ground." The ubiquity of patriarchal authority
caused judges to favor husbands' claims over wives' and, in some
instances, prohibited wives from bringing adultery claims at all.34
Wives also faced harsher standards of fidelity. Some jurisdictions
allowed a husband to bring a successful claim of adultery by prov-
ing that his wife had been unfaithful only once, while requiring
that a wife prove that her husband had committed adultery plus
another fault ground for divorce in order to prevail on an adultery
claim against her husband." Even if she did prevail, a wife risked
economic and financial devastation by publicly denouncing her
husband.36 Not surprisingly, despite adultery serving as the ex-
clusive fault ground for fifty percent of divorces between 1692 and
1786, the first woman to cite adultery in a divorce action did not
occur until 1774." A wife was further discouraged from exposing
a husband's adultery because he might respond with an accusa-
tion that she, too, had been unfaithful." This type of allegation
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 340 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001)).
29. Id. at 1018 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 916 (W.
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jeremy D.
Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 217
(1986).
30. See Weinstein, supra note 29.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 202 (noting society's recognition of adultery as an egregious offense that
"invaded a husband's 'rights' over his wife").
33. See Meghan E.B. Norton, The Adulterous Wife: A Cross-Historical and Interdisci-
plinary Approach, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6 (2008).
34. See id. at 7.
35. See id. at 6 n.25 (citation omitted); see also 1 WILLIAM T. NELSON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE § 129, at 179-80 (1895).
36. Norton, supra note 33, at 7-8.
37. Id. at 6-7.
38. See id. at 7. Recrimination prevented parties from obtaining a divorce where the
672 [Vol. 46:667
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could harm the wife's reputation, which in turn might impact her
opportunity to obtain a favorable divorce judgment." Whether or
not it actually prevented adulterous behavior, the near certainty
of economic ruin served as an indirect preventive mechanism for
discouraging reports of adultery. Appearing early on in the courts'
gender-disparate treatment of adultery allegations, the role of the
states in discouraging adultery has had a long tradition.
States' efforts to deter adultery historically involved assigning
varying degrees of criminality to adulterous acts.40 Although crim-
inal statutes did little to discourage the actual practice of adul-
tery, they have not only endured but also encountered little re-
sistance. 41 Legislators have resisted dismantling statutes that
regulate consensual intimacy because the principles driving them
have persevered despite the behavior having flourished.42 States
have also identified policy interests for retaining criminal adul-
tery statutes, namely preserving social morality and providing
faithful spouses with legal recourse.4' However, few modern
court considered them both comparatively at fault. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 137 (2011).
In an action for divorce, a person sued may recriminate and plead in defense
the conduct of the plaintiff, and, if both parties are equally at fault, a divorce
will not be granted. Accordingly, if the conduct of both parties has been such
as to furnish grounds for divorce, neither of the parties is entitled to relief.
Id. Although the doctrine of recrimination was not universally applied, its limited applica-
tion eradicated the possibility of a wife obtaining an economically favorable ruling based
on her husband's offenses.
39. See Norton, supra note 33, at 7.
40. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution,
30 J. FAM. L. 45, 50-52 (1991-1992). Twenty states have criminalized a singular adulter-
ous act, regardless of whether the infidelity continued after the first act; three states have
criminalized cohabitation between a spouse and a third party but not the adulterous act
itself; and one state has only criminalized repeated adultery. Id. at 50-51; see also Law-
rence M. Friedman, The Eye That Never Sleeps: Privacy and Law in the Internet Era, 40
TULSA L. REV. 561, 568 (2005) (noting that some states have articulated statutory thresh-
olds on the manifestation of adultery, criminalizing "open and notorious" adultery rather
than "simple [discreet] adultery") (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal
Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 173-74 (1997).
42. Id. at 173-74 & n.24; see Siegel, supra note 40, at 87 (explaining that states have
identified certain continuing interests in curbing adulterous behavior, such as reducing
illness and bolstering marriage). Although Siegel criticizes the validity of these rationales,
he concedes there is a social impetus for maintaining them. Id. at 87-89; see Erik Encar-
naci6n, Note, Desuetude-Based Severability: A New Approach to Old Morals Legislation, 39
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149, 167 (2005) ("[O]nce morals legislation is understood as
serving a largely symbolic function, the judiciary may then preserve its symbolic elements
while disarming its potentially harmful aspects.").
43. Phyllis Coleman, Who's Been Sleeping in My Bed? You and Me, and the State
Makes Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1991); see DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR
PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 136 (2009).
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courts prosecute adultery in a criminal context, preferring in-
stead to address it in the realm of civil law disputes.4
Though criminal adultery bans were rooted in protecting a
husband's property interest in his wife-and enforcement of crim-
inal bans has largely disappeared---contemporary rationales exist
for punishing adultery in civil divorce actions. Courts have iden-
tified an important policy interest in protecting the marital unit
from infidelity.4 6 According to one commentator, "extramarital in-
tercourse often violates important promises, results in lies and
deception, inflicts emotional pain, and can terminate or severely
disrupt a marriage."47 One such disruption is the risk posed by
physical infidelity of sexually transmitted disease or procrea-
tion.48 Courts have also suggested that adulterous behavior can
affect the welfare of children produced by the marriage because it
endangers their "development and ability to experience a healthy,
happy life."49 To the extent that a court believes a child's best in-
terests have been threatened, it may factor adultery into its con-
sideration of child custody as well as property and support
awards.o
C. Modern Application of Adultery
Although adultery often represents the classic fault ground for
divorce, the burden of proving it may have impaired its effective-
ness as a remedy for the harm it causes. As a baseline require-
ment, states define adultery as sexual intercourse taking place
between a married person and an unmarried or married third
party, with some states recognizing lesser degrees of sexual con-
tact described in their respective statutes.51 Most courts require
44. See generally Encarnaci6n, supra note 42, at 152-53 (providing a detailed descrip-
tion of the principle of desuetude, which addresses "dead letter" laws).
45. See Constitutional Barriers, supra note 9, at 1679-80.
46. See id. at 1680.
47. Id. at 1677.
48. See Cossman, supra note 10, at 277.
49. Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the "No-Harm" Rule in Custody Litiga-
tion, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 83 (2002) [hereinafter Parental Infidelity]; see Constitutional
Barriers, supra note 9, at 1679-80.
50. See Parental Infidelity, supra note 49, at 83; see also Constitutional Barriers, su-
pra note 9, at 1679-80 (stating that for purposes of determining child custody, adultery
should be a relevant factor only to the extent that the adulterous activity threatened the
child's best interests).
51. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 420-29 (2d ed. 2009)
674 [Vol. 46:667
VIRTUAL ADULTERY
proof of adultery by clear and convincing evidence,52 and though
parties may bring in circumstantial evidence," many litigants are
deterred from initiating adultery claims by the level of intrusion
necessary to gather evidence against their spouses."
With the emergence of no-fault divorce, the role of adultery in
civil divorce litigation has arguably been displaced, but not re-
placed. Even in no-fault divorce proceedings, many state statutes
allow courts to factor adultery into determinations of property
distributions and spousal support, and some states even require
courts to do so." Thus, while evidence of adultery-or a compara-
ble statutory fault ground-is not required in order to obtain no-
fault divorce, it may influence the allocation of assets to the di-
vorcing parties and child custody." Although courts have declined
to penalize a spouse's adultery by denying custody, they have
acknowledged that adulterous conduct may raise "moral fitness"
concerns, which are important in determining whether a spouse
can effectively parent his or her child." As such, adultery may
serve an indirect punitive function in custody rulings.
(citing N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 170(4) (Consol. 2008)); see also 49 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3
(1998).
52. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 51, at 433; see Morse, supra note 21, at 609-10 (noting
that some states require that a party satisfy only the least stringent preponderance of the
evidence standard to prove adultery).
53. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 294 (2010).
Although facts and circumstances sufficient to prove adultery need not be
such that an inference of guilt is the only possible conclusion that can be
drawn from them, they must be such as to lead to the fact of adulterous in-
tercourse, not only by fair inference, but as a necessary conclusion.
Id.
54. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 51, at 429 ("[S]pouses wishing to rely on adultery
as a ground for divorce more often encounter evidentiary issues .... .").
55. Woodhouse, supra note 23, at 2536 ("[Plerhaps because of history, fault plays a
more complex set of roles in alimony than in property distribution. It may determine eligi-
bility to receive alimony, liability to pay alimony, and the amount of the award.").
56. Id. at 2528. In Virginia, for example, one spouse's adultery eliminates the inno-
cent spouse's obligation of support unless "manifest injustice" would result from a bar to
support. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008); see id. § 20-91; see also Morse, su-
pra note 21, at 644. Vermont, on the other hand, defers to judicial discretion in weighing
the effect of adultery on support allocations. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 634 (1987).
57. See Bower v. Bower, 758 So. 2d 405, 409-10 (Miss. 2000).
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III. INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND INFIDELITY
A. The Expanding Scope of Infidelity
The degree of physical infidelity required to constitute adultery
has proved to be malleable depending on the court and the appli-
cable statute. Some jurisdictions recognize that extramarital sex-
ual acts other than intercourse may qualify as adultery." Others
have determined that same-sex affairs constitute adultery suffi-
cient to bar the award of alimony." One court has even held that
for the purpose of adultery determinations, the appearance of in-
fidelity outweighs any likelihood that no physical act occurred."
That court gave equal consideration to the manifestation of infi-
delity and the physical consummation of the affair, essentially
giving weight to the effect of the wife's infidelity on the faithful
husband rather than simply to the adulterous act itself.61
The notion of "virtual adultery," which also lacks a physical
consummation, emerged in large part because of its ability to
cause similar harms to the emotional component of the marriage.
Professor Brenda Cossman suggests that the "violation of the
promise of emotional and sexual exclusivity" resulting from the
physical infidelity is the true harm to marriage, not the infidelity
itself." If the main harm is the broken verbal promise of monog-
amy-not the physical act-then adultery might describe any sit-
uation wherein a spouse contravenes the "emotional exclusivity"
of the marriage." The underpinnings of virtual adultery lie in
what Cossman labels the "new infidelity," whereby increasing so-
cial outlets have created the opportunity to change how relation-
58. See, e.g., Rosser v. Rosser, 355 So. 2d 717, 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Menge v.
Menge, 491 So. 2d 700, 701 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
59. RGM v. DEM, 410 S.E.2d 564, 567 (S.C. 1991). The court applied the reasoning of
a Florida court that had found "no substantial distinction [between heterosexual and
same-sex adultery], because both involve extra-marital sex and therefore marital miscon-
duct." Id. (quoting Patin v. Patin, 371 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
60. Nemeth v. Nemeth, 481 S.E.2d 181, 184 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (determining that a
"[w]ife's opportunity and inclination to commit adultery" by sharing sleeping quarters
with a man who was not her husband satisfied the husband's burden of proof, even though
a pre-existing medical condition may have prevented the wife from carrying out a physical
affair).
61. See id.
62. Cossman, supra note 10, at 279.
63. See id. at 279-80.
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ships are conducted." The primary feature of this new infidelity,
according to Cossman, is that it lacks any static definition." It is
used to describe extramarital relationships both in terms of where
cheating occurs-in the workplace and online, for instance-and
what behavior constitutes cheating.6 6 For instance, this new infi-
delity can describe both a sexual romance in the office and an
"emotional affair" with a colleague." Rather than pinpoint a sin-
gle way to cheat, the new infidelity describes how emerging social
media have enabled spouses to intimately interact with others
without straying physically.
Commentators point to the advantages of an intimacy that sat-
isfies the same emotional cravings of an affair but without the
same risks traditionally posed by adultery. Because health and
reproductive issues are not at stake in the context of nonphysical
affairs, Cossman suggests that the new focus becomes the emo-
tional aspect of these relationships." A 2004 ABC News survey
showed that of the sixteen percent of adults polled who admitted
to infidelity, thirty-three percent primarily wanted to satisfy an
emotional void whereas forty-five percent did so purely for the
physical affair." Particularly in cases of online relationships,
spouses can fashion the emotional affair they want without wor-
rying about the risks of a physical affair.
Nonphysical affairs may also seem less harmful to the emo-
tional stability of the marriage. According to psychiatrist Gail
Saltz, "[w]e've all grown so used to watching, reading, and hear-
ing sexually suggestive material that there's no longer an obvious
verbal or physical line we think we're crossing."6 Saltz posits that
emotional infidelity has flourished because "[p]eople enmeshed in
nonsexual affairs preserve their deniability" and therefore suffer
64. See id. at 280.
65. Id. at 277.
66. See id. at 276-77.
67. When Friendship Becomes an Emotional Affair, TODAY WEEKEND EDITION (Aug.
11, 2006, 1:11 PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/14287231/ns/today-today-weekend.ed
ition/twhenfriendship-becomes-emotional-affair/#.TvAOxXP4H64. An "emotional affair,"
according to Dr. Dale Atkins, "is about forming meaningful attachments with people other
than your partner in ways that prevent your partner from having ... deep emotional in-
timacy with you." Id.
68. See Cossman, supra note 10, at 279.
69. LANGER ETAL., supra note 4, at 24.
70. Gail Saltz, Could You Be Having an Emotional Affair?, CNN LIVING (May 21,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-05-2 1/living/o.having.emotional.affair_1_sharon-affair-
marriage?_s=PM:LIVING.
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fewer feelings of culpability." However, a variety of social com-
mentary suggests that spouses often consider emotional affairs
just as damaging-if not more so-than sexual infidelity." Per-
haps this is because the emotional affair intrudes most heavily on
the communication aspect of marriage. Peggy Vaughan reasons
that "[m]ost people . . . can recover from sexual infidelity more
readily than from the fact that they were lied to."" Psychology
Today's Michael J. Formica describes emotional infidelity as "any
situation that creates or causes some degree of emotional unavail-
ability on the part of one partner that interferes with one particu-
lar aspect of the relationship, along with the quality of the rela-
tionship as a whole."" Despite "harmless" shared commonalities,
emotional infidelity can develop when the majority of personal
communication occurs with someone outside of the marriage, es-
pecially if the tenor of the communication tends to be aspirational
rather than practical."
Ironically, one of the consequences of the expanding scope of in-
fidelity-beyond increased opportunities to cheat-may be that
spouses are unintentionally unfaithful. For a spouse who sub-
scribes to the traditional definition of adultery, an extramarital
relationship that lacks a physical component is not an affair at
all. Because emotional infidelity is grounded in a social rather
than physical connection, emotional affairs are often rooted in
friendship.76 In eighty-two percent of affairs, the disloyal spouse
cheats with someone who was first "just a friend."" In other cas-
es, a common bond cements the social relationship, such as a mu-
tual work environment." Based on these commonalities, the emo-
tional adulterer may not even consider the behavior wrong."
7 1. Id.
72. See Aaron Ben-Zeiv, Does Being True to Your Heart Imply Emotional Infidelity?,
PSYCHOL. TODAY BLOG (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/in-the-name-
love/200809/does-being-true-your-heart-imply-emotional-infidelity.
73. Denise Schipani, Are You Emotionally Cheating?, WOMAN'SDAY (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://www.womansday.com/sex-relationships/dating-marriage/are-you-emotionally-cheat
ing-101955.
74. Michael J. Formica, Emotional Infidelity: When Is Cheating Really Cheating?,
PSYCHOL. TODAY BLOG (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/enlightened-
living/200809/emotional-infidelity.
75. See Heather Johnson Durocher, The Affair You Don't Know You're Having,
REDBOOK, Aug. 1, 2007, at 97.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Schipani, supra note 73.
79. See Formica, supra note 74.
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B. The Role of Social Media in Facilitating Virtual Infidelity
The prevalence of existing social media, such as workplace re-
lationships and newer Internet-based vehicles of communication,
has facilitated interactions outside of the marriage and provided
additional fora for virtual infidelity."o Infidelity in both types of
social environments struggles to gain legitimacy as a legal claim
because, while spouses treat the intimacy in their interactions as
authentic, they simultaneously downplay their extramarital rela-
tionships as either fictional or merely collegial." However, a CBS
News survey found that, as early as 2009, virtual infidelity was
the catalyst for one-third of divorces.82 This suggests that emo-
tionally faithful spouses hardly view online dalliances and office
intimacy as harmless interactions.
The breadth of available social media-e-mail, the workplace,
and virtual worlds to name a few-has given spouses the auton-
omy to build extramarital relationships on their own terms. In-
ternet users' ability to dictate the tone, subject matter, and priva-
cy level of their online conversations allows them to also control
what features they reveal about themselves and to divulge infor-
mation relatively free of consequences." Christina Tavella Hall
suggests that "[tlechnologies abound which make interacting with
others online as enticing as meeting them in real life, or more
so.... All these technologies could be used in one way or another
to experience a unique relationship."84 Some Internet games, for
example, fabricate entire worlds wherein users create avatars of
themselves and intermingle with other avatars." In effect, these
manufactured figures add an extra layer of separation between
the computer user and his or her online actions. Yet from the
nonparticipating spouse's perspective, virtual characters can
seem less like a separate entity and more like an extension of the
computer user. According to one spouse who met her husband in
a virtual game world and subsequently found him "cuddling" with
80. Schipani, supra note 73.
81. See Aaron Ben-Ze6v, Is Chatting Cheating?, PSYCHOL. TODAY BLOG (Sept. 5, 2008),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/in-the-name-love/200809/is-chatting-cheating.
82. Tatiana Morales, A Look at Internet Infidelity, CBS NEWS (Aug. 4, 2003), www.cbs
news.com/stories/2003/08/04/earlyshow/living/caught/main566488.shtml.
83. See Hall, supra note 6, at 214-17.
84. Id. at 216.
85. See Alter, supra note 1.
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another avatar, the online persona's actions manifested the hus-
band's impulse to cheat." Psychologist David Greenfield suggests
that more than simply enabling cheaters to cheat, the myriad op-
portunities for online infidelity have actually induced spouses to
cheat." For example, a Fox News survey suggested Facebook has
made it possible for spouses to reunite with acquaintances-even
former partners-in a casual setting." Greenfield cites the oppor-
tunity to put oneself in a dating situation without the same risks
as a face-to-face encounter as an attractive scenario, and suggests
that spouses who would never attempt a physical affair might
more comfortably try out an online affair."
Other types of virtual infidelity, like office relationships, con-
centrate a particular type of social interaction within a finite
space. Similar to Internet-based media, the cloak of a professional
workplace environment may reduce inhibitions and facilitate dif-
ferent personas.o Virtual infidelity in the office may be particu-
larly difficult to identify if a spouse does not realize that a non-
physical office relationship has begun to impair the marital
relationship." The nature of the workplace may require employ-
ees to spend a significant amount of time together, so spouses
may believe they are being faithful so long as they do not cross
the boundary of physical intimacy." Though the spouse in the
workplace may experience more behavioral restraints than the
spouse chatting on the Internet, both can use their surroundings
to conceal the intimate connections they establish outside of the
marriage.
86. See Cyndy Aleo-Carreira, Is It Adultery if It Was in a Virtual World?, PC WORLD
AUSTRALIA (Nov. 18, 2008, 9:54 AM), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.aularticle/267757/it-
adulteryjitvirtualworld_/.
87. A Private Eye for Online Affairs, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:34 PM) www.cbs
news.com/stories/2003/07/30/techlmain565915.shtml [hereinafter A Private Eye] (explain-
ing that the low cost, ease of use, and "anonymity of the Internet" has lowered the
"threshold" for initiating affairs).
88. See Facebook Is Driving the Divorce Rate Up, Says One Survey, FOXNEWS.COM
(June 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitechl2010/06/02/survey-shows-facebook-driving-
divorce-rate/.
89. See A Private Eye, supra note 87.
90. See When Friendship Becomes an Emotional Affair, supra note 67 (discussing a
"common language" between coworkers).
91. See Peterson, supra note 7.
92. See Schipani, supra note 73.
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C. Crossing Over to Realism: Effects of an Online Affair on Two
Marriages
This section compares two marriages that suffered the effects
of an online affair. In both circumstances, the husband initiated a
virtual relationship via a computer game and never met the
woman on the other end of the computer. Their wives' reactions to
the affair differed drastically, however. These comparisons illus-
trate how the meaning of a virtual relationship can vary consid-
erably between spouses.
In 2007, the Wall Street Journal observed Sue and Ric
Hoogestraat's marriage through the lens of Ric's attachment to a
virtual-world computer game." The game, aptly named Second
Life, provides users with their own avatars as well as various ac-
cessories and real estate available for purchase with U.S. dol-
lars." Married less than one year, Ric began spending anywhere
from six to fourteen hours a day on Second Life, depending on his
work schedule." Sue, who declined to join him in the computer-
ized world, was shocked to discover one day that he had acquired
not only a virtual business and three-story house, but also a vir-
tual wife.96 Although neither avatar's human incarnation ex-
pressed a desire to the other to rendezvous in real life, Sue none-
theless felt betrayed." Rather than eat meals or leave the house,
Ric would log on to Second Life, where he would meet up with his
avatar wife almost immediately." The two avatars would then
greet friends (avatars controlled by other users) and engage in
virtual-world daily activities." Back in the couple's home, Sue
projected that her husband might spend years reenacting his
youth on the computer while his actual life-and marriage-
slipped away."'
In 2009, Second Life had an even more drastic effect on the
marriage of a couple in England. According to Amy Taylor her
husband's feelings for his avatar companion replaced those he felt
93. Alter, supra note 1.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
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for her.o' Taylor had also joined Second Life, where the two held
themselves out as a couple, and she "caught" her husband's ava-
tar being unfaithful on at least two occasions.10 2 Although Taylor
considered leaving her husband for his virtual infidelity she sug-
gested it was he who eventually ended the marriage by confessing
that he was in love with another avatar.' Eventually, his profile
indicated he had become engaged once more through the online
104game.
These two scenes demonstrate important contrasts in the
meaning of an online affair to the Internet user, the appearance
of the relationship to the Internet user's spouse, and the potential
for the new relationship to erode the marriage. In the first sce-
nario, Ric insisted his online affair was simply a game and re-
fused to accept that it had become an intrusion on his marriage,
both to his physical relationship and to the emotional intimacy
that he and his wife formerly shared.' 5 The notion that he was
committing infidelity was demonstrated more by the time he
committed to his virtual partner-and diverted from his actual
partner-than by an emotional connection with the woman con-
trolling the avatar. Taylor's husband, on the other hand, seemed
to merge his virtual identity with his existing social relationships,
making it possible for a new virtual partner to displace a concrete
marriage. His example illustrates that the meaning a spouse at-
tributes to an online relationship may be an important gauge of
its impact on the marriage.
As indicated by Sue and Taylor, a spouse's reaction to the oth-
er's online affair might vary depending on the depth of the virtual
relationship.106 Even though Ric's online gaming created a barrier
101. After Virtual Affair, Real Divorce, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 2:01 PM), www.cbs
news.com/stories/20081/14/tech/main4606394.shtml. Taylor's story correlates to a 2008
survey conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute analyzing the effect of Internet behavior
on intimate relationships both before and after partners had met. The Role of the Internet
in UK Married Life: Survey Results from the Oxford Internet Institute, UNIV. OF OXFORD
(Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news/?id=258. "Survey respondents said they would
be 'unhappy' about their partner doing the following online with somebody else: falling in
love (97%); having cyber-sex (94%); disclosing intimate details (92%); communicating rela-
tionship troubles to others (89%); sharing personal information about the other partner
(88%); flirting (85%)." Id.
102. After Virtual Affair, Real Divorce, supra note 101.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See Alter, supra note 1.
106. Compare id., with After Virtual Affair, Real Divorce, supra note 101.
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to his marital relationship, he viewed the game almost as a build-
ing project.10 ' Taylor's husband, on the other hand, allegedly
treated the game as an alternate life. Because Taylor had joined
Second Life as well, she interacted with her husband's dual per-
sonas and was therefore able to experience his virtual infidelity
firsthand."' Although Ric did not cultivate new emotional connec-
tions, his absence from the marriage nevertheless deprived his
wife of the emotional intimacy they formerly shared.
These two couples' experiences with virtual infidelity reiterate
the potential difficulties in establishing a baseline for actionable
virtual behavior. Although the depth of the virtual relationship
and the faithful spouse's reaction may be important tools in this
determination, neither is necessarily dispositive of virtual adul-
tery. Yet these virtual relationships impose risks similar to tradi-
tional adultery-such as fabricating emotional connections that
supersede (or even replace) the existing partnership-and can
implicate similar policy concerns against diverting attention from
the marriage.
IV. APPROACHES TO RECOGNIZING VIRTUAL ADULTERY
The contemporary policy justifications for adultery statutes-
namely of insulating the marital unit and protecting family life-
support the continued application of adultery to civil divorce
judgments. Courts grant fault-based divorces, andlor make unfa-
vorable spousal support and property awards on the basis of adul-
tery in order to discourage this type of conduct and uphold estab-
lished policy goals. Because virtual infidelity has begun to create
similar harm to marriage-and trigger the same policy con-
cerns-the current definition of adultery may not serve the inter-
ests it was designed to protect. Having discussed the similarity of
harms virtual infidelity can produce in comparison to traditional
adultery, the question becomes whether courts should recognize
virtual adultery for remedial purposes in divorce proceedings. De-
ciding to recognize virtual adultery would raise an equally im-
portant question-how to gauge when harmful virtual behavior
constitutes actionable virtual adultery.
107. See Alter, supra note 1.
108. See After Virtual Affair, Real Divorce, supra note 101.
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There are at least two possible approaches to recognizing vir-
tual adultery for remedial purposes. In the first approach, indi-
vidual state legislatures may decide to establish bright-line rules
regarding what types of virtual infidelity rise to the level of adul-
tery for fault and other civil divorce purposes. A second approach
acknowledges that virtual adultery deserves consideration in de-
termining fault and other incidents of divorce, but rejects the use
of bright-line rules to determine what specific behavior consti-
tutes adultery-as opposed to. traditional adultery statutes that
impose baseline requirements such as sexual intercourse or other
physical acts. Instead of defining virtual adultery in terms of spe-
cific conduct, the second approach would defer to judicial discre-
tion to evaluate what constitutes adultery on a case-by-case basis.
Conversely, in a status quo approach, state legislatures may de-
cline to extend the legal definition of adultery to virtual infidelity
on the basis that virtual infidelity is either too amorphous to mer-
it a judicial remedy or sufficiently distinguishable from tradition-
al adultery to deny the same remedies that are available for the
latter. This section rejects the status quo approach and addresses
the two approaches that would introduce virtual adultery into
remedial schemes, ultimately advocating adoption of the discre-
tionary approach.
A. Rejecting the Status Quo Approach
The advantage to adopting approaches that penalize nonphysi-
cal extramarital intimacy is that they recognize that emotional
intimacy with someone other than a spouse can produce the same
damage to the marriage as physical infidelity. Cossman posits
that "emotional infidelity has become as much a violation of mar-
riage as is sexual infidelity. Sex has become an expression of the
underlying emotional intimacy."' Another commentator suggests
that "[a]dultery matters . . . because it erodes the intimacy be-
tween spouses. And if this is why adultery matters, then other
erosions of spousal intimacy, other factors that similarly contrib-
ute to disconnection, should also justify divorce.""o Despite
changes in the type of conduct that adultery encompasses, the
policy interests in preventing it remain largely the same-
109. Cossman, supra note 10, at 280 (emphasis added).
110. Gary Chartier, Divorce: A Normative Analysis, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 9
(2008).
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namely, protecting the strength of marriage and the family. To
continue to achieve these policy goals, judicial remedies must
capture the new harms that cause the same damage. Emotional
unfaithfulness can create the same destruction of trust consist-
ently recognized as integral to the marital unit."' Following
Cossman's reasoning, then, preventive policy measures should ex-
tend to the root cause of infidelity, not merely its manifestation.112
Punishing virtual infidelity would simply compensate faithful
spouses for the same emotional harms to the marriage that phys-
ical adultery already produces and public policy aims to deter.
Commentators who do not support legal recognition of virtual
adultery as a fault ground suggest that the most substantial po-
tential harms to the marriage caused by adultery are irrelevant
to virtual affairs."' Hall posits that nonphysical affairs "bear only
a fraction of the consequences which accompany actual adultery.
Without physical contact, the possibility of an unwanted preg-
nancy or sexually transmitted disease is impossible.""4 Sue
Hoogestraat and Amy Taylor might disagree with this compari-
son of potential harm. Even though the physical risks associated
with traditional adultery do not translate to virtual adultery, this
comment suggests that emotional affairs can inflict a comparable
amount of harm on a marriage. Cossman adds that "[p]regnancy
is no longer the central harm of adultery. Rather, adultery is now
framed as a violation of the promise of emotional and sexual ex-
clusivity."' Decreased physical risks of adulterous conduct do not
lessen the breach of "exclusivity" that defines virtual infidelity."'
Public policy already recognizes the importance of exclusive mari-
tal intimacy to protect marriages and families; adultery statutes
only address the physical component of intimacy. Virtual adultery
schemes would additionally address emotional infidelity, which
currently has no legal remedy.
111. See Schipani, supra note 73.
112. See Gail Saltz, You Don't Have to Have Sex for It to Be an Affair, TODAY (Aug. 17,
2005, 9:13 PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/8990045/ns/today-relationships/t/you-dont-
have-have-sex-it-be-affair/#.TvA3RXP4H64 (suggesting that faithful spouses may consider
physical and emotional affairs equally harmful to the marriage).
113. See Hall, supra note 6, at 204-05.
114. Id. at 220.
115. Cossman, supra note 10, at 279.
116. See id.
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B. Bright-Line Rule Approach
A bright-line rule approach to virtual adultery identifies specif-
ic nonphysical behavior that constitutes adultery in the context of
divorce. This approach identifies virtual adultery when the non-
physical infidelity triggers the same policy goal of insulating the
marriage. Since the physical component would not apply here,
courts instead would look to whether the nonphysical infidelity
impedes on the emotional component of the marriage. Regardless
of the level of emotional intimacy achieved by the extramarital re-
lationship, the key consideration is the extent to which it detracts
from the emotional intimacy of the marriage. This determination
pinpoints the types of nonphysical conduct that create the same
emotional consequences as physical adultery, such as distrust of
the unfaithful spouse. Rather than expanding the definition of
adultery, this determination would fill a gap left by traditional
adultery statutes that do not provide a remedy for the transfer of
intimacy in the absence of a physical affair."7
The most apparent disadvantage to a bright-line rule approach
is its potential to be over- or under-inclusive in defining adulter-
ous virtual conduct. The difficulty in making rules for what de-
gree of nonphysical conduct should be punished is foreshadowed
even in current debates about the standards that should apply in
determining traditional adultery. For example, in evaluating cir-
cumstantial evidence of adultery, courts have split on whether
manifestations of adultery are sufficient for a faithful spouse to
succeed on a fault-based divorce action. An Alabama court found
that evidence of love letters did not provide sufficient proof of a
husband's adultery."' Courts in both South Carolina and Louisi-
ana found that a wife had committed adultery by sharing a bed-
room with another man-even without proof that sexual inter-
course had occurred."' Although the courts conducted their
analyses to determine whether the circumstantial evidence
against the spouse was sufficient to prove adultery, in doing so
they evaluated whether certain conduct on the part of the accused
117. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (stating that adultery involves
"[a]ny person, being married, who voluntarily [has] sexual intercourse with any person
who is not his or her spouse").
118. Maddox v. Maddox, 553 So. 2d 611, 612 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
119. See Bonura v. Bonura, 505 So. 2d 143, 145 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Nemeth v. Nemeth,
481 S.E.2d 181, 184 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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spouse was inherently improper and suggestive of extramarital
conduct-the same type of conduct that might harm the emotion-
al trust in a marriage regardless of whether physical infidelity oc-
curred.
The Louisiana court's standard for finding adultery was "the
rejection of the spouse coupled with out-of-marriage intimacy."'
"Rejection," which traditionally might have required an affirma-
tive manifestation of intent to end the marriage, might today re-
flect Ric Hoogestraat's excessive gaming.'2 1 "Out-of-marriage in-
timacy," which traditionally required an extramarital sexual act,
might today include Ric's virtual wife.'22 The established rule pun-
ishing only physical sexual acts is easiest to enforce, but may po-
tentially overlook behaviors that nonetheless harm the faithful
spouse.
Legal recognition of virtual adultery does carry a risk of engen-
dering a windfall of actionable nonphysical behavior. Because
emotional infidelity is inherently more subjective than physical
infidelity, it is difficult to draw boundaries for improper conduct.
This is both because "faithful" spouses may subscribe to different
ideas of what constitutes infidelity and because "unfaithful"
spouses may not be aware that they have crossed the line beyond
acceptable extramarital conduct. This risk must be weighed
against the policy interest in strengthening marriage and the ju-
dicial interest in compensating innocent spouses via property and
spousal support allocations.'23
Another concern is whether creating bright-line rules to punish
virtual adultery adequately serves the policy interest in prevent-
ing marital harm. Contemporary justifications for punishing
adultery focus on preventing externalities that impair the intima-
cy of the marriage-yet there is no judicial consensus on what
level of nonphysical conduct begins to harm the marriage. The
faithful spouse's reaction to the virtual relationship can be an im-
portant indicator of the harm that the infidelity has created.
However, arbitrary rules of actionable nonphysical conduct would
120. S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124, 127 (N.J. 1992); see also Bonura, 505 So. 2d at 145
(limiting the court's holding to the facts of the case and suggesting an analysis of individ-
ual facts and circumstances in future cases).
121. See Alter, supra note 1.
122. See id.
123. See Swisher, supra note 22, at 258-59.
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regulate the act itself, but not the broader impact of the behavior
on the marriage. As such, a bright-line rule approach may not be
helpful because it does not necessarily know what behavior to de-
ter.
C. Discretionary Approach
A discretionary approach to virtual adultery acknowledges that
certain nonphysical, intimate conduct can constitute adultery and
implicate the same policy concerns, while simultaneously recog-
nizing that it is difficult to identify that conduct in a vacuum. In-
stead, its advocates suggest writing virtual adultery into statuto-
ry fault ground considerations for divorce and deferring to
judicial discretion to evaluate the totality of the circumstances in
determining fault. Virginia law, for instance, states that a court
"shall consider the circumstances and factors which contributed
to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including adul-
tery."' A discretionary approach suggests placing virtual adul-
tery within the totality of factors a state court applies in deter-
mining the cause of divorce, thereby allowing individual courts to
recognize egregious instances of emotional infidelity while filter-
ing out interactions that do not rise to the intimacy level of an in-
appropriate relationship.
The primary advantage in placing virtual adultery determina-
tions within judicial discretion is that it recognizes the complexi-
ties of proving emotional intimacy under the traditional standard
of clear and convincing evidence.12 5 Although courts may consider
reducing the standard of proof to a preponderance of the evidence,
a lesser standard may not adequately address virtual infidelity
either. The "ephemeral sphere of emotional or virtual infidelity"-
which could involve such conduct as an online "proxy kiss"-
would likely fail to satisfy any existing standard of proof for adul-
tery.'2 6 Wereas an extramarital physical act may instantly trig-
ger an adultery statute, courts cannot feasibly deter the series of
small behaviors that may lead up to an emotional affair. An emo-
tional affair, rather than initiating with a single physical cata-
lyst, can build upon a continuing thread of ostensibly harmless
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
125. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 51, at 433.
126. See Hall, supra note 6, at 221.
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communication.12 7 A discretionary approach would identify on a
case-by-case basis the point at which emotional intimacy becomes
sufficiently integrated into the extramarital relationship to im-
pose on the marital unit.
Considering the relevant costs and benefits, a discretionary
approach is ultimately a better solution than the alternative
bright-line rule approach to address virtual adultery in the fault
system. A discretionary approach best supports the policy ra-
tionale for punishing virtual adultery-that courts should deter
extramarital emotional intimacy for the effects it can produce on
the marital unit. Although it may incidentally accomplish this
goal, a bright-line rule approach-like its statutory predeces-
sors-seeks to punish particular acts without giving thought to
how that conduct affects the marriage. This might leave the exact
same statutory gaps currently in place, which compensate certain
adulterous acts while failing to recognize others. Rather than de-
ter spouses from seeking intimacy outside the marriage, bright-
line rules merely add more behaviors to the list of actionable con-
duct-leaving the would-be unfaithful spouse free to engage in
any type of emotional relationship not captured by the applicable
fault scheme. A discretionary approach, on the other hand, looks
to the compilation of behaviors that comprised the marital break-
down. It might also look to the faithful spouse as a barometer for
determining the severity of the other spouse's conduct, recogniz-
ing the faithful spouse's contribution to sustaining the marriage
after the affair. A discretionary approach considers the entirety of
an emotional affair-as opposed to a single nonphysical act-in
deciding fault. Although less consistent with current statutory
schemes that require specific adulterous acts, a discretionary
method more closely conforms to policy goals of containing inti-
macy within the marriage and deterring harmful extramarital in-
teractions.
V. CONCLUSION
Although deciding how (or whether) to craft a compensatory
scheme for virtual adultery is not yet underway, this comment
suggests that the increasing communication outside of the mar-
127. See Schipani, supra note 73.
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riage has future implications for fault-based divorce as well as
other incidences of divorce. Recognition of virtual adultery can
make an important remedial contribution to existing adultery
considerations by acknowledging that preserving emotional inti-
macy within marriage serves similar policy interests as safe-
guarding physical fidelity. If increases in the use of social media
have enabled adulterous relationships to occur almost anywhere,
statutory schemes should not be so limited. This comment
acknowledges the difficulty in establishing bright-line statutory
rules for compensating victims of nonphysical infidelity and sug-
gests adopting a discretionary approach to incorporate virtual
adultery into existing fault (and other) schemes. Transferring
discretion to individual courts accomplishes the underlying policy
interest in shielding marriages from the external harm-not just
physical harm-that extramarital relationships can produce. Ra-
ther than adding unique behaviors disjointedly to an existing set
of remedial schemes, a discretionary approach seeks to capture
the nuances in behavior that characterize these new virtual rela-
tionships.
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